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Atoms as Universals 
Matthew Tugby 
Atomic objects and realism about universals 
This chapter explores how atomism – the view that there are fundamental indivisible objects – can be 
combined with a realist ontology of universals. We propose and develop a new theory that views an 
atom as an instance of a simple universal (such as being an electron) rather than a bundle of multiple 
universals. According to this theory, which we shall call the Simple View, atoms are simple in the 
strongest sense because they lack inherent qualitative complexity as well as spatial complexity. This 
theory is motivated, in part, by what is known as the Axiom of Difference. After introducing the Simple 
View, we address what is arguably its most serious objection, which is that the theory faces difficulties 
in accommodating talk of ‘fine-grained’ attributes, such being unit negatively charged or having a 
certain mass. We conclude by exploring some possible solutions to this problem. Although the Simple 
View is not endorsed here, we hope to show that this previously unexplored theory is a live contender 
that is worthy of discussion in future debates about atomism, not least because it provides a very 
parsimonious ontology. 
Atomism is the view that there is a fundamental level of reality containing indivisible objects. 
Science may not yet have discovered the genuine atoms – perhaps subatomic particles or strings have 
an inner mereological complexity that is yet to be discovered. Nonetheless, if atomism is correct, then 
matter is not infinitely divisible. The world contains simples out of which every other object is 
composed. 
Atomism has a long history, going back to the ancient period and the metaphysics of Leucippus and 
Democritus. Different versions of atomism differ in important details on questions about the 
metaphysical nature of atoms. For example, if atoms have no spatial parts, are they immutable or is it 
possible for an atom to take on new qualitative properties? Does atomism entail that motion is discrete 
rather than continuous? Is it coherent to say that indivisible atoms are extended? Even though atoms 
are indivisible, do they have complexity of some other metaphysical kind, such as qualitative 
complexity? Indeed, most of these questions are addressed in this collection of papers. 
The last question listed earlier, which will be the focus of this chapter, is particularly fundamental 
because it concerns the intrinsic natures of atoms. A qualitatively complex atom would be one that has 
distinct properties (universals) as constituents and consideration of such complexity can lead to other 
atomist theories, such as logical atomism that is briefly summarized further. The aim of this chapter, 
though, is to present a new theory that many would regard as radical, one which says that indivisible 
atoms completely lack inherent qualitative structure. This proposal will be developed within a realist 
property ontology of universals. If the proposal is correct, then atoms are simple in the strongest sense. 
In the next two sections we will begin to show that if universals are the fundamental metaphysical 
constituents of reality, then there are good reasons for taking atoms to be both qualitatively and spatially 
simple. The implications of this conclusion for the theory of universals will then be explored. Before 
proceeding, though, it will be helpful to see which forms of atomism draw the opposite conclusion and 
maintain that atoms are qualitative complex rather than simple. 
One way of establishing that atoms are qualitatively – even if not spatially – complex is to pair 
atomism with a so-called ‘factualist’ ontology, rather than a ‘thingist’ ontology.1 The factualist ontology 
was made popular through the work of Russell (1956) and Wittgenstein (1922) in the early part of the 
twentieth century. Roughly, the factualist approach says that objects have an inner metaphysical-cum-
logical complexity. This complexity has a proposition-like structure: the fundamental ontological units 
consist of particulars instantiating some monadic universal (property) or of multiple particulars standing 
in relations. Property universals, unlike particulars, can be instantiated in more than one place at the 
same time. Although facts are in some sense made up of particulars and universals, facts are still the 
fundamental units given that (plausibly) particulars cannot exist without instantiating some universals. 
Nonetheless, the instantiation of these properties gives rise to an inherent qualitative complexity, 
especially given that objects tend to instantiate multiple properties. This factualist approach continued 
to be popular in the second half of the twentieth century through influential philosophers such as D. M. 
Armstrong (1997), who refers to facts as ‘states of affairs’. 
Another way to believe in inherent qualitative structure is to keep properties (of a certain sort) in the 
ontology but reject the idea that particularity is a fundamental metaphysical concept. The most common 
version of this universals-only ontology is known as the bundle theory, according to which fundamental 
objects are bundles of universals such as mass, charge or spin.2 This approach provides an alternative 
to factualism, which (arguably) takes the categories of particulars and properties to be equally 
fundamental. As we shall see further, this approach is attractive in many ways but faces a problem 
acknowledged by Hochberg (1965), based on what he calls the Axiom of Difference. Importantly, we 
shall see that the Axiom of Difference puts pressure on universals ontologists to accept that instances 
of fundamental universals are simple in both the spatial and qualitative sense, which gives rise to a 
particularly strong form of atomism. On this view, atoms – conceived as instances of universals – are 
as simple as a concrete entity can be. I call this the Simple View of universals. This theory is unexplored 
in the literature on fundamental ontology and the aim of this chapter is to fill this gap and provide a 
platform for future work. Although I shall not go as far as to endorse the Simple View here, I shall offer 
some speculations about how it could overcome what is one of its most serious objections. 
The chapter is structured as follows. As a way into the Simple View, I start in the second section by 
considering the bundle theory of universals in more detail and some of the problems that it faces. The 
Simple View will then be offered in the third section as a theory which is in the spirit of the bundle 
theory but which avoids certain problems concerning indiscernible objects. This theory pairs atomism 
with the view that atoms lack an inherent qualitative structure. Again, atoms on this theory are 
conceived as instances of simple universals. In the fourth section, I outline further benefits of the Simple 
View before introducing the main challenge facing the theory, which is to explain how atoms that are 
simple in the aforementioned senses could differ in their attributes. In the fifth section, I offer some 
speculations on how this problem might be overcome. 
The ontology of universals 
2.1 The bundle theory of universals 
Given that we are assuming that universals form the fundamental ontological category, a useful starting 
point for this discussion will be the bundle theory of universals, which was developed in the twentieth 
century by philosophers such as Russell in later work (1959, Ch. 14), Hochberg (1964, 1965) and more 
recently O’Leary-Hawthorne (1995) and Curtis (2012). According to realists about universals, 
properties are entities in their own right and are identical in all their instances.3 According to the bundle 
theory of universals, objects are constituted by nothing more than the universals they instantiate. No 
bare particularity is added as a further ingredient. Objects are nothing more than a combination of 
universals standing in certain structural relations or ties, sometimes called ‘compresence’ relations. 
What benefits does the bundle theory bring for realists about universals? A common line of defence 
is to point out that opposing theories, such as factualism, typically involve the obscure notion of bare 
particularity, or what some call ‘substance’. The bare particular or substance is what instantiates the 
universals, while at the same time serving as the ground for an object’s individuation. In his later work, 
Russell raises the following complaint: 
Substance, when taken seriously, is a concept impossible to free from difficulties. A substance is supposed 
to be the subject of properties, and to be something distinct from all its properties. But when we take away 
the properties, and try to imagine the substance by itself, we find that there is nothing left. (1945, 211) 
 
For the purposes of this chapter, we need not assess the strength of this objection. My aim is merely to 
indicate why some have taken the ‘properties-only’ ontology to be attractive, as well as parsimonious. 
For our purposes, what is important is to consider an objection facing the bundle theory, which I shall 
use as a way of motivating a new ‘universals-only’ theory. As explained earlier, this theory views 
universal instantiations, such as ‘being an electron’, as atoms that lack inherent qualitative structure. 
On this view, these universal instances are simple in the strongest sense and one advantage of this theory 
is that it does away with the need for bundling relations, which many also take to be problematic. 
2.2 Bundle theory and the problem of indiscernibles 
The problem of indiscernibles is one of the most pressing problems facing the bundle theory of 
universals. The problem is relatively easy to state. To use a famous example from Black (1952), 
consider a symmetrical world containing two indiscernible globes. Given that the globes have all the 
same properties (including their relational properties), they must be constituted by the very same 
universals. But if an object just is a bundle of universals, then the ‘two’ globes ought to be the one and 
the same object. And yet, it seems that there are two different globes in the world we have stipulated. 
Thus, this thought experiment seems to provide a counterexample to the bundle theory of universals. 
Moreover, although globes are complex, non-fundamental objects, the same thought experiment be run 
with whatever fundamental objects there are or might be. 
The bundle theorist has two main ways of responding. The first option is to simply bite the bullet 
and accept that Black’s world contains just one object. But if the bundle theorists do that, they owe us 
an explanation for why there appears to be two objects when there is just one.4 Alternatively, the bundle 
theorist can develop the theory in such a way that it allows the possibility of two indiscernible objects. 
I take it that this second option is to be preferred, all else being equal, given that it preserves the strong 
intuition that there could be two indiscernible objects. An early advocate of this second strategy was 
Hochberg (1964, 1965), who we shall now discuss. I shall then use some of his comments about the 
indiscernibility debate to motivate the new atomistic theory sketched earlier. 
Put simply, Hochberg argues that proponents of the bundle theory can accommodate the existence 
of two indiscernible objects in the following way. They can claim that two indiscernible objects are 
simply two distinct instances of the same bundle of universals. That is to say that although constituted 
by the same bundle, each instance is simply numerically different, even though their constituent 
universals are identical (1964, 84–6, 1965, 87–95). To help us to get a grip on this kind of view, it will 
be helpful to quote Rodriguez-Pereyra at length, since his more recent version of bundle theory appears 
to be what Hochberg might have had in mind: 
I suggest the bundle theorist should tell the following story . . . Unlike the bundle itself, an instance of a 
bundle cannot be in more than one place at once. So a bundle that is in more than one place at once has 
more than one instance, one in each place in which it is. These instances are not identical to each other, 
since they are in different places at once and they cannot be in more than one place at the same time. Thus 
this bundle of universals wholly located here is the same bundle as that bundle of universals wholly located 
there, but this instance here of the bundle in question is not the same as that instance there of the same 
bundle. (2004, 78) 
One initial critical response is likely to be that the concept of an ‘instance’ is itself bound up so closely 
with the concept of particularity that Hochberg and Rodriguez-Pereyra are simply smuggling in the old 
notion of bare particularity or substance. Is this fair? I do not think so. Note, first, that few bundle 
theorists deny that we should accommodate talk of particularity. Rather, the debate concerns how 
particularity enters into the picture and whether it is fundamental or non-fundamental. And as we have 
described it, Hochberg’s view of particularity is certainly different to the orthodox bare particular theory 
in this regard, contra Shorter’s worries (1964). On the bare particular view, two distinct but 
indiscernible objects are distinct in virtue of having different constituent bare particulars. Those two 
constituent bare particulars are said to ‘differ simply’; a brute numerical difference which grounds the 
difference between each of the objects that have these respective bare particulars as constituents. On 
my interpretation of Hochberg’s view, in contrast, objects do not inherit their numerical identity from 
a constituent bare particular. Rather, numerical identity attaches to the bundle directly, rather than via 
a constituent bare particular. Supporters of Hochberg can then argue that this is perfectly coherent: 
different instances of a bundle differ ‘simply’ in the same way that, on opposing theories, bare 
particulars differ simply. Both views invoke brute differences, it’s just that these brute differences arise 
in different places. Unlike the bare particular theorist, the bundle theorist locates the source of the 
distinctness of things in the ‘simple differences’ of objects qua entities constituted by bundles of 
universals. 
Unfortunately, as Hochberg acknowledges, opponents are likely to want to block his moves on the 
grounds that they violate the ‘axiom of difference’ (1965, 89). This axiom says the following: 
Axiom of Difference: Only simple entities can differ simply. 
Given that bundles of universals are qualitatively complex, in virtue of containing multiple universals, 
the Axiom of Difference implies that instances of such bundles cannot differ simply. What, though, 
does simplicity mean in this context? As Hochberg understands the axiom, simple entities are those that 
do not have proper parts: they are mereologically simple. As Hochberg puts it, the Axiom of Difference 
is based on the idea that ‘two wholes, to be two, must differ in a part’ (1965, 91). The worry then is that 
because Black-type globes are mereologically complex objects, they cannot differ simply in the way 
that the bundle theorist requires. Indeed, the globes are complex in more than one sense. They have 
spatial parts, and according to the bundle theory, the globes are constituted by multiple universals, 
which means they also have qualitative parts. The globes therefore fail the simplicity test twice over. In 
short, what the axiom implies is that in order to distinguish the two globes, further discriminating 
constituents or parts of the globes are needed, such as bare particulars. And given the Axiom of 
Difference, this explanation of distinctness can only be delivered by the bare particulars if they 
themselves are simple entities. 
3. The Axiom of Difference and a new proposal 
Where does the universals-only ontologist go from here? There are two main options. Perhaps the most 
obvious option for the bundle theorist is to reject the Axiom of Difference. This is the option that 
Hochberg pursues (1965, 87–95). But there is another option for the universals-only ontologist, which 
has received little attention as far as I know. The option is to accept the Axiom of Difference and to try 
to respect it. My aim in the rest of this chapter is to give this strategy a shot by developing a new version 
of atomism. I do not have a deep argument to offer for the Axiom of Difference but I feel its intuitive 
pull. As Lewis (1986) urges, composition is, first and foremost, a mereological notion. And it is widely 
accepted that, for example, no two sets are composed of the very same parts (1965, 37). So, I think that 
abandoning the Axiom of Difference is a theoretical cost. Moreover, even if the Axiom of Difference 
is not sacrosanct, it is surely a worthwhile philosophical exercise to consider whether and how the 
Axiom of Difference could be accommodated within the ontology of universals. This exercise should 
be of particular interest to atomists because, as we will see, the Axiom of Difference pushes advocates 
of the ‘universals-only’ approach towards a strongly atomistic conception of reality. 
Given what was said earlier, it seems clear what a universals-only theorist would have to do to 
accommodate the Axiom: they would have to say that instances of universals lack parts in both a spatial 
and qualitative sense.5 If instances of universals are to lack spatial parts, they must be atoms in the sense 
defined at the start of the chapter. On this theory then, there would be no universals corresponding to 
complex objects such as ‘being human’ or ‘being a planet’. Rather, humans and planets would be 
mereological sums of fundamental universal instances. The only genuine non-relational universals 
would be those corresponding to kind terms in our most fundamental science – which may, given what 
we currently know, turn out to be universals like being an electron or being a proton. Thus we are left 
with what is known as a ‘sparse’ conception of kind universals.6 Secondly, unlike the orthodox bundle 
theory, the atomic universal instances would have to be qualitatively simple in order to respect certain 
readings of the Axiom of Difference. That is to say, the spatially simple instantiations cannot themselves 
have inherent qualitative parts: if the instances of universals are to differ simply, they cannot be 
conceived as bundles of further constituent universals. I shall explore this theory of universals in more 
detail further but for now we may formulate the theory as follows. I call it the Simple View: 
Simple View: All objects are either instances of  single non-relational universals that are simple 
(spatially and qualitatively) or mereological sums of objects that are simple (spatially and 
qualitatively). 
Let us now say more about the Simple View. According to this theory, an object is identified with 
an instance of a single universal that is simple in the sense that it has neither spatial nor qualitative parts 
(in line with the Axiom of Difference). Given this simplicity, we can maintain that instances of a given 
universal can differ simply, in the sense to be clarified further. Although these universals have no inner 
complexity, they nevertheless determine the various qualitative profiles of their instances (more on this 
later). A helpful way of thinking about the sorts of universals that the Simple View requires is to think 
of them as what are traditionally called ‘substantial universals’, such as electronhood and protonhood. 
An electron, for example, would on the Simple View be seen simply as an electronhood instance. Note, 
though, that the term ‘substantial universal’ is slightly misleading here, given that we are eliminating 
bare substance from the picture (‘kind universal’ is perhaps better). On this view, an electron is not 
composed of a bare particular plus multiple constituent universals, as on most factualist views, but is 
instead constituted by a universal simpliciter: it is simply an electronhood instance. The important point 
to emphasize here is that this universal is not to be reduced to the more fine-grained properties that we 
would normally associate with an electron, such as negative unit charge, ½ spin and so on. An atomic 
object’s ‘kind essence’, for want of a better term, is unstructured and qualitatively simple on this view. 
But of course, we need to tell a story about how talk of these more fine-grained properties arises. Indeed, 
the main problem facing the Simple View is precisely that of explaining how an object can at once be 
simple while also providing truthmakers for our more fine-grained property ascriptions. This is a 
problem I will address in the fifth section. 
First, though, let us briefly set aside another worry. One’s immediate reaction might be that, on the 
Simple View, an electron is just a trope by another name (i.e. a wholly particularized entity, rather than 
something constituted by a universal). I agree that universal instances look a lot like tropes on this view, 
but the important difference is that proponents of the Simple View take seriously the idea that (say) 
electronhood really is a repeatable. Indeed, it is this repeatability which allows one and the same 
universal to be instantiated more than once. That is to say, it is a primitive fact that a universal can occur 
in more than one place at the  same time. Different instances of universals are observable when 
universals spread themselves around, so to speak. In the case of complex indiscernible objects such as 
globes, these will be distinguished by being mereologically composed of different instances of the 
relevant fundamental universals,7 and in the case of indiscernible atoms, these are manifestations of 
simple universals. 
To further clarify, one way of understanding this position is that it offers a sort of compromise 
between the two strategies outlined earlier for dealing with Black’s indiscernible objects. The bundle 
theorists’ bullet-biting response, recall, is to accept that there is just one object present in Black’s 
thought experiment, while the more ambitious response (from Rodriguez-Pereyra and others) is to 
preserve the intuition that there are two distinct objects, even though those objects are constituted by 
the same universals. According to the Simple View, there is something correct in  both strategies. In 
one sense, indiscernible objects are one and the same because they are one and the same universal. On 
the other hand, when universals have more than one instance, they typically occupy more than one 
spatiotemporal location – and one can observe the existence of the universal in one place without 
knowing that it also exists elsewhere. When we focus on a specific manifestation of the universal in this 
way, we can say we are observing a specific instance of it. Thus, in Black’s thought experiment it is 
also correct on the Simple View to accept that there are two or more instances of the relevant universal. 
If it is asked how it is that one and the same universal can manifest in more than one place, the answer 
is simply that this is a primitive fact about universals. If one finds an apparent contradiction in the idea 
that one and the same universal has different instances, one must bear in mind that universals are not 
particulars. Again, universals are repeatables and it is this repeatability which allows distinguishable 
occurrences of one and the same thing. 
Some advantages and problems for the Simple View 
What then are the advantages that the Simple View has over the bundle theory? Although I think an 
exploration of the Simple View is valuable in itself (an exercise, so to speak, in how the world might 
be), this exercise would be less interesting if there were no obvious theoretical advantages of the view. 
One of the challenges facing the bundle theory is that we need a transparent account of what holds 
the component universals together. Why do some universals bundle together rather than others? The 
mere existence of a set of universals alone surely does not dictate which bundles there are, so it seems 
we need something extra to tie the bundles together. We mentioned such ties earlier. These are typically 
called ‘compresence’ relations, although Hochberg prefers to call them ‘structural’ or ‘ontological’ ties. 
But at this point, the bundle theory faces a dilemma. If the ties are themselves relational universals, then 
we become susceptible to the infamous Bradlean regress problem. If the ties are themselves genuine 
parts of the bundle, what ties them to the bundle? At this point, it seems we need to invoke further ties, 
ad infinitum. The second option is to deny that the structural ties are genuine entities. But then it seems 
these ties are asked to perform an impossible role. They must at once structurally tie universals together 
without being genuine relations and, correlatively, they must make a difference to the bundle without 
being an addition of being. For this reason, many have complained that such ties are obscure. Hochberg 
accepts that, in the light of the Bradlean regress problem, the bundle theorist must accept the second 
option (1964, 82), but he does not offer much in the way of illumination regarding these structural ties, 
other than describing them as a kind of ontological glue (1964, 84). Of course, if we opt instead for the 
Simple View, we avoid the problem of compresence, since there are no complex universal bundles to 
tie together in the first place. 
More generally, the Simple View is about as ontologically and ideologically economical as one can 
get. Atomic objects are not only spatially but also metaphysically simple, in the sense that they have no 
inherent qualitative or propositional complexity. Moreover, only one ontological category – of 
universals – is needed for this analysis of objects. 
Unfortunately, though, the parsimony of the Simple View may also come at a cost, one which we 
must now discuss. This is what I take to be the greatest challenge facing the view. Given that it has such 
sparse metaphysical resources, one might question whether it can give an adequate explanation for the 
full range of truths about objects. If fundamental objects are instances of structurally simple ‘kind’ 
universals, in what sense can we ground talk of ‘fine-grained’ sparse properties, like charge, mass and 
spin? Such properties are often called the attributes of an object, as opposed to natural kinds (e.g. Lowe 
2006). To be sure, a proponent of the Simple View can insist that an electron is the way it is in virtue 
of being an electronhood instance. But how, exactly, can we ground the specific truth that a particular 
electron is unit negatively charged or that it has ½ spin? Because instances of electronhood are utterly 
simple on the view we are considering, it is hard to see wherein the specific property of, say, negative 
charge lies. This worry cannot be dismissed because, importantly, fine-grained attributes help to fix the 
causal profiles of objects, on which scientific enquiry is based. If electronhood is simple and 
unstructured, what explains why Ernie the Electron has the disposition to accelerate rather than the 
disposition to explode? The challenge, in short, is to explain how an atomic object could at once have 
a simple nature and yet be multifaceted. In the next section I will conclude the chapter with some 
speculations about possible solutions. 
How can an atom at once have a simple nature and yet be multifaceted? 
My aim in the final main section is to show that there are at least two solutions to the problem outlined 
earlier. One of these solutions sits well with a broadly dispositional theory of attributes, according to 
which the identity conditions for attributes are based on the causal profiles associated with those 
properties. In other words, on the dispositional approach the attributes are specified in terms of what 
their possessors would do in various counterfactual scenarios, such as giving rise to certain gravitational 
behaviours in the case of mass. In contrast, the opposing categoricalist theory of attributes denies that 
attributes have a dispositional essence. Rather, they take attributes to be primitive self-contained 
qualities that can be associated with different causal profiles in different possible worlds, depending on 
the laws of nature in those worlds. My aim is to show that there are theories of attributes in both the 
dispositionalist and categoricalist camps that can accommodate talk of fine-grained properties within 
the Simple View. Moreover, they can do so without reducing attributes to mere concepts that creatures 
like us happen to impose on things. For the purpose of this chapter, I shall not attempt to decide which 
solution is more attractive, as doing so would require a more detailed comparative analysis. However, 
by showing that there are potential solutions to the problem, I hope to show that the Simple View is at 
least a live contender in debates about the nature of atoms. There may also be other versions of the 
Simple View that I do not consider here and I welcome further work on this issue. 
Let us start with a dispositional solution. One way to accommodate the idea that atoms are simple, 
yet have a diverse range of attributes, is to accept a broadly Rylean theory of dispositional properties 
(Ryle 1949). According to this approach, for an object to have a dispositional property just is for certain 
subjunctive facts to hold – counterfactuals which specify how the object would behave if certain 
conditions were to arise. To use a macroscopic example, we might say that a ball is spherical if and 
only if the following sorts of subjunctive facts hold of it: it would roll if placed on a slope; it would 
appear a certain way to humans when looked at in certain lighting conditions; it would leave a round 
indentation when placed on a soft cushion; and so on. In short, these subjunctives would specify the full 
dispositional profile of an attribute and thereby distinguish that attribute from others. As Whittle (2009) 
explains, the Rylean approach is particularly amenable to a set-theoretical analysis of attributes: we can 
say that attributes are sets of objects that share certain subjunctives in common. Such a view can 
accommodate talk of attributes both at the level of atoms and of spatially complex objects. 
Why then does this offer a solution to the problem of ascribing multiple attributes to a simple object? 
Crucially, there is no reason why a simple object cannot be a member of more than one of the sets just 
described. According to this theory, attributes are not grounded in inherent qualitative structures of 
objects but rather the subjunctive facts that hold of the object. Again, there is no obvious reason why a 
simple object cannot participate in a wide range of subjunctive facts. And according to the Simple View, 
these complex dispositional profiles will depend on the universal that the object instantiates. For 
example, electrons but not protons are negatively charged, where negative charge is understood 
dispositionally, in terms of various subjunctives. Again, at no point in the analysis is there any need to 
posit inherent qualitative structure within an object. 
One objection that this proposal invites is that if instances of universals are simple, then it becomes 
a mystery as to why different universals confer different dispositional profiles. This, it could be argued, 
is why inherent qualitative structure is needed, to explain why some atoms have different dispositional 
profiles. However, the appropriate response to this worry is to say that it begs the question against the 
Rylean approach. The theory is precisely that dispositions, that is, attributes, are not determined by 
qualitative structure. The relevant subjunctive facts are primitive and are not analysed in terms of facts 
about, say, qualitative structure and the laws of nature (see Whittle 2009, 282–3). 
Let us now consider a solution to the problem of attributes that is more amenable to the 
categoricalists’ qualitative account of attributes. The solution I have in mind is based on the idea that 
the qualitative profile of an object is determined by its relation to so-called ‘quality space’. Recently 
Cowling (2014) has offered a detailed metaphysical analysis of attributes which involves a realist 
commitment to quality space – a view he calls ‘locationism’. As we shall see, like Rylean 
dispositionalism, the quality space theory seems well placed to explain how an object could at once be 
simple while also giving rise to truthmakers for our fine-grained property ascriptions.8 
The central thesis of Cowling’s theory is that fundamental (or ‘sparse’) qualities are best thought of 
as points on a dimension in quality space. This entails that reality contains qualitative dimensions as 
well as spatiotemporal dimensions. In the same way that spatiotemporal dimensions form a space 
containing spatiotemporal points, the qualitative dimensions form a space containing quality points. 
Each dimension represents a specific type of fundamental quality, of which there are several. Reality 
thus contains an n-dimensional quality space, where n represents the number of quality types. 
Furthermore, in the same way that space–time has an intrinsic structure (metrical or topological 
features), the quality space has an intrinsic structure which, among other things, determines the 
distances between the various determinate attributes on the various dimensions. On this view, then, 
having qualities is a matter of occupying points in this quality space. Moreover, it seems the quality 
space theorist must allow that, unlike spatial points, more than one object can be associated with the 
same quality point at a given time. This follows simply from the fact that multiple objects can 
simultaneously have the same qualities. 
There are further details about this theory that one could discuss and I direct the reader to Cowling 
(2014) for further details. What is important for our purposes is to see how this picture might help with 
the problem outlined in the previous section. To recall, the mystery facing the Simple View concerns 
how something could at once instantiate a simple universal while also being multifaceted in a way that 
accommodates talk of fine-grained qualities like charge and mass. On the quality space theory, the 
answer lies simply in the nature and topology of quality space. On Cowling’s view, objects are simple 
in the sense that they instantiate one and only one point in n-dimension quality space. The current 
suggestion, then, is that by associating a simple universal like being an electron with a single point on 
quality space, we can accommodate the Simple View’s claim that atomic objects are at once simple yet 
also qualitatively multifaceted. The solution lies in the fact that, given the topology of an n-dimensional 
space, a single point is able to represent what Cowling (2014, 672) calls the ‘entire qualitative profile’ 
of an object.9 This topology is extrinsic to the object that instantiates the relevant point, and therefore 
we need not posit inherent qualitative structure in the object. How though can a single point correspond 
to so many different qualitative attributes? The reason is that a single point in an n-dimensional quality 
space can cut across multiple dimensions simultaneously, which is to say that a single point can obtain 
a value on more than one dimension. Thus, despite being simple, the point can deliver determinate 
values for all the relevant dimensions, values which objectively ground our ‘fine-grained’ property 
ascriptions. 
It is worth noting that this theory of qualities may also bring a variety of other benefits. For example, 
Cowling has suggested that we can illuminate the notion of property (attribute) instantiation within the 
quality space theory (Cowling 2013, §. 1). Given that this picture associates properties with points on a 
space, it opens up the possibility of viewing property instantiation as involving the notion of occupation. 
Speculatively, if we combine this idea with the Simple View, perhaps we could ultimately explain 
objecthood in the following way: atomic objects arise when space–time points and quality points 
somehow intersect. 
To sum up this section, both Rylean dispositionalism and the quality space theory offer hope that a 
proponent of the Simple View can explain fine-grained attributes without making them mind-
dependent. There may also be other solutions that I have not discussed here. However, I hope to have 
done enough to show that the Simple View is a live option in debates about the nature of atomic objects 
and one that deserves further attention. 
Conclusion 
We have seen that there are two traditional ways for a realist about universals to analyse objects. One 
is to view them as bare-particulars-instantiating-universals, as advocated by Armstrong (1997). Those 
opposed to bare particularity have traditionally viewed objects as constituted instead by bundles of 
universals. But we saw how some comments from Hochberg (1964, 1965) point us in the direction of 
another alternative for opponents of bare particularity, which requires a commitment to atomism. We 
called this the Simple View, on which objects are instances of simple universals. The main objection to 
the view is that it makes a mystery of fine-grained attributes like ‘having negative charge’. I have 
concluded the chapter with a speculative discussion about ways in which this problem could be 
addressed. 
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1 ‘Thingist’ ontologies take particulars but not properties to be ontologically fundamental. Thingist ontologies are 
closely associated with nominalist theories of properties, which deny that objects have inherent qualitative 
structure. Since the aim of this chapter is to explore how atomism can be combined with realism about universals, 
I shall not discuss the thingist approach further.  
2 Another kind of bundle theory holds that objects are bundles of tropes rather than universals (e.g. Williams 
1953). Unlike universals, tropes are not repeatable, which is to say they can only be instantiated once. Thus, like 
the factualists, trope theorists arguably take the notion of particularity to be fundamental. For the purposes of 
this chapter, we need not discuss the trope theory further. See the paper of Simons and Carpenter in this 
collection for work on trope theory and atomism. 
3 Immanent realists argue that universals exist in so far as they are instantiated. Platonists, in contrast, allow that 
universals can exist even if they are not instantiated. For the purposes of this chapter, we need not discuss this 
distinction further.  
                                                          
                                                                                                                                                                                    
4 One way to do this is to say that the imagined world has a space–time with an unusual circular shape, which 
creates the illusion that there are two indiscernible globes rather that one: we can imagine going from ‘one’ globe 
to the ‘other’ without realizing that we had in fact travelled round in a circle to one and the same globe.  
5 Another option I can see is for the universals-only theorists to posit haecceities: properties which somehow 
determine the identity and distinctness of objects. However, I shall not pursue this strategy here. Haecceities seem 
just as obscure as bare particulars, if not more so. Moreover it is not clear that haecceities deserve to be called 
universals, given that they cannot be instantiated more than once.  
6 In addition to the non-relational atomic universals, whose instantiations are the world’s fundamental objects, we 
may also need relational universals in our ontology such as spatial or temporal relations. However, since my main 
aim is to explore the metaphysics of objects, I shall not discuss the status of relations here. For further discussion, 
see, for example, Heil (2012, Ch. 7). 
7 See Zhang (2018), who bases a version of the bundle theory of universals on this insight. Like me, Zhang defends 
the idea that instances of universals differ simply, but retains the idea that these instances form bundles. 
8 In what follows I am heavily indebted to Travis Dumsday, who first introduced me to the quality space theory 
many years ago during email correspondence about one of his manuscripts. In the manuscript (‘Moderate 
Locationism and Natural Kind Essentialism’), Dumsday argued that a locationist theory of properties might allow 
an Aristotelian natural kind essentialist to explain how properties are grounded. My pairing of the Simple View 
and locationism in what follows has several structural similarities with Dumsday’s proposal. I note though that in 
recent work, Dumsday (2019, 86) suggests that locationism could be understood as a version of dispositionalism. 
This issue merits further discussion, but for the purposes of this chapter we will work with Cowling’s original 
version of the locationist theory.  
9 Cowling accepts that on other versions of locationism, one could associate points with individual (sparse) 
properties, rather than course-grained (‘complete profile’) properties like electronhood. But for reasons that should 
now be clear, Cowling’s preferred view fits best with the Simple View. 
